Hosted gate · Scorecard · Nov 10 2026, main 6ceb532

21 guarantees,
and how each is checked

The AgentGuard® hosted gate makes 21 guarantees. All 21 pass a property test. 4 are proven on production in full, 3 in part, and 14 are not proven live.

21guarantees, each with an id and a test
30properties, 1,000 generated requests each, all passing
45 of 45deliberate bugs caught, injected one at a time
4 + 3proven on production in full, and in part

How these limits are checked

Each guarantee has an id and a property test. A property test does not check a few examples: it generates thousands of requests and runs each one through the same request handlers that serve agentguard.run.

On November 10, 2026 the suite ran 30 properties, 1,000 generated requests each, and every one passed. The suite was also given 45 deliberate bugs, one at a time, and it caught all 45. Open a row below to read the bugs that were injected for it.

A test suite shows what the code does with generated requests. It does not show what the deployed service does. So each row also says whether the guarantee has been checked on production with real requests, and on which date.

4Proven on production

G09, G30, G31 and G33. Checked in full with real requests.

3In part

G08, G15 and G34. Each row says which part was checked and which was not.

14not proven live

Proven by the test suite, and not yet by a production probe.

The 21 guarantees

Generated inputs per run is the number of generated requests the guarantee's properties run by default. Injected bugs caught counts the deliberate bugs put into a copy of the gate code for that guarantee, and how many made its test fail.

Scorecard · Nov 10 2026, main 6ceb532
IdGuarantee and test fileGenerated inputs per runInjected bugs caughtProven on production
G01

A block or escalate decision never executes or signs an allow.

Test file g01-hold-never-allows.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • POST /api/gate/outcomes accepts a held (escalate) receipt as the authority for an executed action
  • a held money action reserves its amount
1,0002 of 2
not proven live
G02

A caller's risk score can only make a decision stricter, never looser, for any policy and request.

Test file g02-risk-only-tightens.test.cjs

1 injected bug, 1 caught
  • a low risk score clears a hold (risk loosens escalate to allow)
2,0001 of 1
not proven live
G03

The money window cap is never exceeded, even with many allows racing at once.

Test file g03-window-cap-under-races.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • the reservation writes counters without compare-and-set (the atomic check dropped)
  • a money allow stands even when its compare-and-set lost the race
2,0002 of 2
not proven live
G04

Once a policy is pinned on a vendor key, a policy sent in the request never changes the decision, and the receipt says the request policy was ignored.

Test file g04-pinned-policy-wins.test.cjs

1 injected bug, 1 caught
  • a request policy that has rules wins over the pinned policy
2,0001 of 1
not proven live
G05

Per-recipient contact caps, the fleet contact cap and calling windows are never exceeded or bypassed, across time zones; a contact to an unknown time zone is held, not guessed.

Test file g05-contact-caps-and-windows.test.cjs

5 injected bugs, 5 caught
  • off by one on the 24-hour recipient cap
  • the calling window's end minute is treated as inside
  • an unknown time zone is guessed as UTC instead of held
  • the 7-day contact count reads only the last 24 hours
  • a contact allow stands even when its compare-and-set lost the race
4,0005 of 5
not proven live
G06

A contact in a category the recipient opted out of is always refused.

Test file g06-opt-out-refuses.test.cjs

1 injected bug, 1 caught
  • an opt-out of "all" is ignored when the request names a purpose
1,0001 of 1
not proven live
G07

A request carrying a content field, or text over the length limit, is refused, exactly as the /vendors terms define both.

Test file g07-content-refused.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • content field names are matched case-sensitively
  • long strings are read only four objects deep (the bug this suite found, put back)
1,0002 of 2
not proven live
G08

Every signed receipt verifies with the published key, and changing any one field of it makes verification fail.

Test file g08-receipts-verify.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • signer and verifier both leave decision_text out of the signed content
  • the verifier accepts any receipt whose fingerprint matches, without the signature
1,0002 of 2
In partNov 9 2026The live verifier accepted the published demo receipt and rejected a copy with one amount changed. One receipt and one changed field, not every receipt kind.
G09

An action with no matching rule is blocked (default deny), and a claimed capability below the rule's requirement is blocked.

Test file g09-default-deny.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • the rule lookup answers to names every object has, like constructor (the bug this suite found, put back)
  • an unknown capability claim ranks as the highest
2,0002 of 2
Proven on productionNov 9 2026The production sandbox blocks an action typed toString and one typed __proto__.
G10

Only money going out counts toward caps; a payment taken in never does.

Test file g10-only-money-out-counts.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • a payment taken in counts toward the caps
  • an approved payment taken in is added to the fleet money total
2,0002 of 2
not proven live
G11

A held action becomes an allow only through the approver's own link, before it expires, and is decided once.

Test file g11-approval-once-by-the-approver.test.cjs

3 injected bugs, 3 caught
  • an approval is settled with a plain write, not compare-and-set
  • a decision is accepted after the approval expired
  • the approval token is compared by prefix
1,0003 of 3
not proven live
G12

The approver is the operator's setting, never the agent's, and the approval link never goes back to the agent that asked.

Test file g12-approver-set-by-operator.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • the status_url field carries the tokened approval link
  • a request may name its own approver
1,0002 of 2
not proven live
G13

A payee or customer reference never appears in the clear in a receipt, a response or anything the gate stores.

Test file g13-identifiers-stay-hashed.test.cjs

1 injected bug, 1 caught
  • the approval record keeps the raw request action for the approver page
1,0001 of 1
not proven live
G14

Without a vendor key the gate is a sandbox: it stores nothing, counts nothing and never speaks for a real tenant.

Test file g14-sandbox-stores-nothing.test.cjs

1 injected bug, 1 caught
  • sandbox money requests are counted like keyed ones
1,0001 of 1
not proven live
G15

The gate fails closed: if it cannot read or write its store, or cannot sign, the answer is block; a paused tenant is blocked for everything.

Test file g15-fail-closed.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • a failed read of the pause flag counts as not paused
  • when signing fails the money decision goes out unsigned
1,0002 of 2
In partNov 10 2026A paused tenant's new request is blocked on production. A store or signing failure was not induced on production.
G16

With a vendor key the gate counts and keeps time itself: spend, contact counts and times the caller sends never change a decision.

Test file g16-gate-counts-and-keeps-time.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • the caller's window_spent_cents is trusted when sent
  • the caller's evaluated_at is used with a vendor key
1,0002 of 2
not proven live
G30

An action names itself with plain codes: a type that is not a string, a currency that is not a three-letter code or a target system that is not a short code is refused, and nothing is decided, signed or stored from it.

Test file g30-g32-audit-nov9.test.cjs

3 injected bugs, 3 caught
  • an action type that is a list is read as its first name again
  • the currency check accepts any string, a sentence included
  • the target system may be an object again
2,0003 of 3
Proven on productionNov 9 2026Three malformed requests answer 400 invalid_action_shape on production, and an ordinary refund is still allowed.
G31

While a tenant is paused, a hold that was already waiting cannot be approved or denied; no receipt is signed for it until the pause is lifted.

Test file g30-g32-audit-nov9.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • a pending hold is decided while the tenant is paused
  • a pause flag that cannot be read counts as not paused on the approval link
1,0002 of 2
Proven on productionNov 10 2026With a test key: approve and deny on a paused tenant's open hold answer 409 tenant_paused.
G32

At a recipient's contact cap, the counts a caller sends never change the keyed decision (the contact half of G16, reached on purpose).

Test file g30-g32-audit-nov9.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • the caller's recipient_contacts_24h lowers the gate's own count
  • the caller's recipient_contacts_7d replaces the gate's own count
1,0002 of 2
not proven live
G33

An amount above a rule's auto_approve_max_cents is never allowed without a person: it is held, or refused by a stricter limit.

Test file g33-g34-audit-nov9.test.cjs

2 injected bugs, 2 caught
  • auto_approve_max_cents is read for shape and never enforced (as before Nov 9)
  • the higher of the two review limits applies
1,0002 of 2
Proven on productionNov 10 2026Under a pinned key, a refund above the auto-approve limit is held for a person.
G34

Words an agent chose never reach the person who decides: the approval email, text message and page show the operator's own label for the tenant, and the agent's id only as a labelled code, never inside a sentence.

Test file g33-g34-audit-nov9.test.cjs

5 injected bugs, 5 caught
  • the tenant label is taken from the request again
  • the agent id is printed inside the sentence again
  • any agent id is shown, a sentence with brackets included
  • the page judges the stored id, where a sentence has underscores for spaces (as before the Nov 9 keyed test)
  • every stored id is marked as sent plain
1,0005 of 5
In partNov 10 2026The approval page and the approval email show none of the planted words. The text message was not exercised on production.

The test files are in the tests/invariants folder of the gate's source. G30 to G32 share one file, and so do G33 and G34. Evidence for each production check is kept on file.

What this page does not say

The full wording of each guarantee, how the suite works and how to rerun it are in the guarantees file. The gate's contract, the sandbox and the pilot are on the vendors page. To see a hold and an approval in code, read Contact humans with tool calls, enforced.